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Digestion and Re-innovation: A Lesson Learned from China´s High-Speed
Rail Technology-Transfer Agreements
by Joe Massie
Editor’s Note: The following blog post was published on www.ipbrief.net on August 7th, 2011.
Capitalizing on the eagerness of multinational
firms to tap China´s enormous market, the Chinese
government has promoted a development strategy
based on joint ventures between foreign companies
and state-owned enterprises. Such partnerships may
appear to be a small price to pay for foreign companies,
considering the potential financial rewards of entering
the Chinese market. However, closer scrutiny reveals
that companies agreeing to joint ventures with Chinese
enterprises may be falling victim to a myopic focus on
short-term profits, overlooking the long-term threat
posed by such arrangements. The recent experience of
European and Japanese high-speed rail manufacturers
highlights the potential pitfalls of entering into joint
ventures with Chinese state-owned enterprises.
Keen to modernize its aging transport
network, the Chinese government began to consider
the construction of a high-speed rail system in the early
1990’s. In 2002, the Chinese government unveiled a
high-speed rail system produced by Chinese companies,
using only state-controlled manufacturers and Chinese
intellectual property. However, the government
soon recognized that the rail system suffered from
poor reliability and that the project would have to
be scrapped in favor of a rail system based on foreign
know-how. In 2004, work on the original high-speed
rail line was abandoned as the Chinese government
solicited bids from abroad to help in the construction
of hundreds of trains capable of traveling at speeds in
excess of 200 mph.
Japanese and European companies had
pioneered the construction of high-speed rail. While
local demand for their expertise had stagnated, China
appeared to be a booming new market. Therefore, an
offer by the Chinese government offering access to its
rail market in return for the transfer of the companies´
technology proved enticing. Bids were soon submitted
by the world´s principle rail manufacturers: Alstom
(France), Siemens (Germany), Bombardier (Canada),
and Kawasaki (Japan).
As part of the business arrangement, the
foreign companies had to set up production facilities
within China and assemble the trains through local
joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers. While
helping to develop the local supply chain for train
components, the companies also had to train Chinese

engineers, sharing their entire know-how and catalogue
of technologies. One joint venture partner, Kawasaki,
even brought Chinese engineers to its Japanese
manufacturing facilities for training.
By insisting on such close cooperation with
foreign manufacturers, the Chinese government
was implementing a “digestion and re-innovation”
program aimed at learning, adopting, and tweaking
foreign technology. Although some industry insiders
questioned the prudence of the arrangements,
companies were spurred by the contracts that were
being offered and a fear that they would be left behind
by their competitors if they chose not to participate.
What the foreign rail manufacturers did not expect was
that once their technology had been shared, they would
slowly be phased out of the Chinese rail industry,
to be replaced by domestic manufacturers, and that
former Chinese clients would soon become their global
competitors.
In 2007, China first introduced its locally
assembled high-speed trains based on foreign
technology platforms. Today, the newest Chinese
trains contain amenities not found in competitors´
trains and, according to their Chinese manufacturers,
are more technologically advanced than their foreign
counterparts. Based on the knowledge they have
gained over the past decade, Chinese rail manufacturers
have now turned their attention to markets abroad,
participating in high-speed rail projects in Venezuela
and Turkey, and bidding on contracts in Brazil, Russia,
and even the United States. While the Chinese
government is quick to claim that its advances in rail
technology were achieved independently through
Chinese ingenuity and innovation, some industry
insiders have characterized such claims as mere
propaganda.
Foreign rail manufacturers have been reluctant
to criticize China´s actions publicly for fear of being
locked out of the Chinese market, but privately
many have acknowledged that they have been the
victims of forced technology transfers and patent
infringement. Prompted by Chinese attempts to file
21 high-speed rail patents, Kawasaki issued a statement
condemning China´s actions and questioning the
provenance of supposed Chinese innovations. The
Japanese train producer claims that much of the
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technology is actually foreign technology that has
been dressed-up and that the Chinese manufacturers
have violated the technology-transfer contracts by
ignoring clauses stipulating that the technology was
only to be used in products intended for the Chinese
domestic market. The company has also vowed to
take legal action to protect its patents. While publicly
dismissing the claims made by Kawasaki, the Chinese
rail ministry is currently investigating the industry´s
exposure to intellectual property suits should Chinese
manufacturers begin selling trains abroad.
The experience of foreign rail manufacturers
in China should provide a lesson for other industries
seeking entry into the Chinese market. Technologytransfer schemes, whereby Chinese state-owned or
semi-private enterprises seek to partner with foreign
companies in joint ventures in return for access to
the Chinese market, may initially appear highly
lucrative. However, such deals could possibly result in
the creation of Chinese competitors, who have access
to all the patented technologies and know-how of
their foreign counterparts, but are able to offer their
products and services at a far lower cost. Furthermore,
foreign firms risk having their technologies stolen,
“digested,” “re-innovated,” and then patented by their
Chinese partners. Considering the potential long-term
repercussions of such arrangements, foreign enterprises
may want to reconsider entering into technologytransfer agreements.
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